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ABSTRACT
Traditionally, the Greek mathematical termdýnamis is interpreted alternatingly as “square”
and “root/side of square”. A survey of the usages of the term and of the related verbýnasthai
by Plato, Aristotle, and various mathematical authors including Eudemos/Hippocrates, Euclid,
Archimedes, Hero, Diophantos, and Nicomachos, shows that all are compatible with a familiar
concept of Babylonian mathematics, the square identified by (and hence with) its side. It turns
out that a “geometers’dýnamis” and a “calculators’dýnamis” must be differentiated; that the
technical usage for the former became fixed only around the mid-fourth century B.C.; and that
it vanished except in specific connections and formulaic expressions by the third century.
Along with the conceptual congruity, Babylonian and Greek terms share a number
of everyday connotations. This suggests that the Greek concept may have been inspired or
borrowed from the Near East. This hypothesis can be neither proved nor disproved directly
by the sources, but it is internally coherent and fruitful with regard to the existing material.
RESUMÉ
La tradition interprête alternativement le terme mathématique grecdýnamis comme “carré”
et “racine carrée”. Un aperçu sur les modes d’emploi du terme grec chez Platon, Aristote, et
chez un nombre de mathématiciens (dont Eudème/Hippocrate, Euclide, Archimède, Héron,
Diophante, et Nicomaque) fait pourtant voir que l’on peut comprendre tous ces modes d’emplois
à partir d’un concept familier aux mathématiques babyloniennes, à savoir le carré identifié par
(et donc avec) son côté. Il s’ensuit aussi qu’il faut distinguer entre la “dýnamis des géomètres”
et la “dýnamis des calculateurs”; que l’usage du premier ne devient fixe qu’au milieu du
quatrième siècle avant J.-C; et qu’il disparaît du discours géométrique courant à partir du
troisième siècle avant J.-C. et n’est conservé que dans des contextes spécifiques.
Le contenu conceptuel commun et l’existence de connotations secondaires partagées
suggèrent la possibilité d’un emprunt du concept. Cette hypothèse ne se laisse ni prouver ni
réfuter directement par les sources; elle résulte pourtant cohérente et féconde pour l’interprétation
des documents existants.
Among the most debated single terms of ancient Greek mathematics is the worddýnamis1,
the basic everyday meaning of which is “power”, “might”, “strength”, “ability” etc. [GEL, 452a-b].
Responsible for this debate are first of all the paradoxical ways in which Plato uses the term
in Theaetetus, especially because these ways appear to disagree with Euclid’s use of the term
in the Elements.
The word is absent from Books I through IX of theElements. In Book X, def. 2, however
we read that straight lines (ευθειαι ) are “commensurable in respect ofdýnamis (δυναµει
συµµετροι ) whenever the squares on them (τα απ’ αυτως τετραγωνα) are measured by the
same area”. This indicates thatdýnamis should be read as “square”, while raising the problem
of why it is used instead of the current termtetragon.
In Plato’sTheaetetus, a “dýnamis of three feet” ([δυναµις ] τριπους) appears to be a square
of the area three square feet (147d 3-4)2. A little bit later, however,dýnamis is the term chosen
for certainlines (γραµµαι) – viz., lines which “square off” (τετραγωνιζειν ) non-square numbers
(anachronistically expressed, lines the lengths of which are surd). The latter use of the word
has given rise to the other traditional interpretation of the word, as “side of square” or “square
root” – eventually as “irrational square root”.
A third text has often been taken into account in these discussions. In Eudemos’ account
of Hippocrates of Chios’ investigation of the lunes (as quoted by Simplicios [Thomas 1939,
238]) it is stated (in words which may perhaps go back to Hippocrates himself) that similar
circular segments have the same ratios “as their bases in respect ofdýnamis” (και αι bασεις
αυτων δυναµει ), while circles have the same ratio “as the diameters in respect ofdýnamis”.
The Euclidean dative formdynámei is thus found (with approximately the same meaning) in
a text dating back to the fourth or maybe even the fifth century.
FURTHER OCCURRENCES: THE EARLY EPOCH
In this paper, I intend to show that the apparently equivocal use of the term need not be
considered equivocal after all, by pointing out an analogous conceptual structure in Babylonian
mathematics. Before presenting this parallel I shall, however, give a more precise survey of
the mathematical uses of the Greek term, in order to uncover more fully its uses and
development.
There are, indeed, a number of less frequently discussed occurrences of the term and of
the related verbdýnasthai (δυνασθαι ; non-technical meaning “to be able/strong enough (to
1 Extensive references to the debate prior to the year 1975 will be found in [Burnyeat 1978].
Among later discussions of the term, [Knorr 1975], [Taisbak 1980] and [Taisbak 1982] should
be mentioned.
2 Burnyeat [1978, 492f] renders the whole passage 147c7 to 148d7 quoting John McDowell’s
English translation, renderingδυναµις as “power”. In the Loeb edition, Fowler [1921] translates
the term as “root”.
do something)”, “to be worth”, “to be able to produce”, etc. – GEL, 451b-452a). As a preliminary
(semantically uncommitted) translation integrating connotations of physical power as well as
commercial value, I shall use “be worth” when discussing the mathematical uses of the verb.
Instead of the expression “in respect ofdýnamis” I shall mostly use the Greek dativedynámei.
The verb is used in close connection with the noun in the centralThe etetus passage (148a6-
b2):
THEAETETOS. We defined all the lines that square off equal-sided numbers on plane
surfaces as lengths, and all the lines that square off oblong [i.e., non-square – JH] numbers
asdynámeis, since they aren’t commensurable with the first sort in respect of length but
only in respect of the plane figures which they are worth.
This translation reproduces McDowell as quoted by Burnyeat [1978, 493], with these
exceptions: “dynámeis” is used instead of “powers”; “are worth” instead of “have the power
to form”; and “in respect of length” instead of “in length”, in order to render the parallel uses
of the dative formsδυναµει andµηκει . It can be seen that the lines which are labelleddynámeis
“are worth” those squares of which they are the sides (anachronistically: The line of length
√3 “is worth” the square of area 3).
In the Eudemos/Hippocrates fragment, the diameterd1 of one circle is said to “be worth”
the sextuple of another circle-diameterd2 when it “is” its sextupledynámei, i.e., whend1
2=6d2
2
(2485 and 2505 combined); the diameter of a circle, being the double of the radius “in length”
(µηκει ) is its quadrupledynámei (2504). Furthermore, the two short sides in a right-angled
triangle “are worth the same” (ισον ) as the hypotenuse (2501), while a linea is said to “be
worth less” than two othersb andc whena2<b2+c2 (2424).
In Aristotle’s De incessu animalium 708b33-709a2, on the other hand, the hypotenuse of
a right-angled triangle is said to “be worth” (not “worth the same as”) the two other sides3;
according to Heath ([1949, 284] against GEL 452a44-45 following the Oxford translation), the
same usage is meant in 709a18-22. An identical formulation of the Pythagorean theorem is found
in the pseudo-AristotelianDe lineis insecabilibus 970a12-14.
In connection with a general discussion of “potency” and “potent” (δυναµις andδυνατος,
respectively), Aristotle explains inMetaphysica 1019b33-34 that the termdýnamis is used in
geometry “by metaphor”; in 1046a -8 he explains the usage as due to “resemblance” (οµοιοτης ).
An explanation of the concept as derived from Aristotelian (or older natural) philosophy should
thus be excluded – even though a metaphor along the lines of “the square which a line is able
to produce” would perhaps not be far from Aristotle’s own understanding of the term4.
3 It should be kept in mind that the Greek verb is transitive; “x being worthY” is thus as
different from “x being worth the same asY” as “x loving Y” is from “x loving the same as
Y” (jealousy apart).
4 Formulations like the latter are found in various commentators from late antiquity (see Burnyeat
[1978, 500 n. 34]. An explicit derivation from natural philosophy is considered “beyond doubt”
by Bärthlein [1965, 45], who, substantiating his claim, mixes up lines and numbers in quite
anachronistic ways.
The examples given so far demonstrate beyond a doubt thatdýn mis anddýnasthai belong
to accepted fourth- (and maybe fifth-) century geometrical parlance. They might also suggest
that the use ofdýnamis in Theaetetus as a designation for a line (be it a specific sort of line)
is a Platonic hint of an idiosyncrasy of the young Theaetetos – as suggested by Burnyeat [1978,
496].
The first of these theses is confirmed by another Platonic passage, while the second is
falsified (pace Burnyeat).Politicus 266a-b contains a pun on the word (already discussed by
Burnyeat [1978, 496] and by Szabó [1969, 90]): Man, having the ability (dýnamis) to walk
on two feet (being “two-feet in respect of ability”/διπους δυναµει) is identified with the
diagonal [of the unit square], which is also “two-feetdynámei”. Similarly, the swine, being
four footed in respect of ability, is the “diagonal of the diagonal” (being four-feetdynámei it
must be of length 2, and so be the diagonal of a square with side√2). We observe that the
“human” diagonal is regarded in the second instance as something possessing itself a diagonal,
i.e., as a square, in a way which defies both the interpretation of thedýnamis of a square pure
and simple and the traditional alternative “side”/“square root”.
Because Theaetetos and “the young Socrates” participate together in the dialogue as they
do in Theaetetus, Burnyeat interprets the passage as another reference to Theaetetos’
characteristic idiom. The pun is, however, put forward by the “Stranger from Elea”, and
furthermore with the words “since both of you are devoted to geometry”. Had Plato wanted
to hint at Theaetetos’ own terminological contributions or habits he would hardly have chosen
this way to express himself. Instead, the pun must be a play on the familiar and shared
terminology of contemporary geometers of the period (or, rather, a terminology which a mid-
fourth century philosopher would find natural in the mouth of a late fifth-century geometer).
FURTHER OCCURRENCES: THE EPOCH OF MATURITY
As is well known, almost all sources for the history of Greek mathematics date from the
third century B.C. or later. Truly, in this age of maturity Greek mathematicians tended to make
less use of thedýnamis/dýnasthai-structure than their forerunners appear to have done in the
period from Hippocrates to Eudemos. Still, both terms occur a number of times in the great
mathematical authors from Euclid onward, in ways which may serve to elucidate the terminology,
showing continuity with earlier usages of varying character.
In Data 64, 65, and 67, Euclid speaks in the enunciations of the amount by which one
side of a triangle “is worth” more or less than the other two sides, with the same meaning and
in the same connection as Hippocrates/Eudemos. In the ensuing demonstrations, however, he
only refers to “the tetragons on” the sides. The same thing happens in proposition 86. It appears
as if thedýnamis/dýnasthai usage had been current at a time (fifth and fourth century) when
certain theorems and standardized expressions were first formulated (the point in question here
being the extended Pythagorean theorem), and that those formulations were handed down
faithfully5. But the actual proofs of theData were formulated in current words, speaking of
tetragons and notdynámei.
Stronger evidence for a changing usage is seen in theElements. Here thedýnamis is avoided
even in the formulations of the theorems until Book X. So, the Pythagorean theorem, which
both Eudemos/Hippocrates and the Aristotelian corpus refer to time and again indýnasthai-dress,
deals here with “the tetragons on” the sides (I.47). The same holds for XII.2, in which “circles
are to each other as the tetragons on their diameters”, whereas Eudemos/Hippocrates had spoken
of the ratio “between the diametersdynámei”.
In Books X and XIII we find the traditional usage – but only in definitions, in theorems,
and in proofs referring to definitions or theorems or (in a few cases) summing up a result in
formulaic language. During the free discursive argumentation on figures, all references are to
“the tetragons on” the lines in question. X, def. 2, which was already quoted above, explains
the formula “commensurabilitydynámei” of two straight lines as “commensurability of the
tetragons on” the lines, and can thus be taken as a paradigm for the general relation between
formulae and free speech.
The formulae which are used belong without exception to types with which we are already
familiar from earlier sources. We find the counterposition of “commensurability in respect of
length” (µηκει ) anddynámei (e.g. X, def. 3); linea “being worth more” than lineb (e.g. X.14),
“being worth n times” b (e.g. XIII.2), or linea “being worth” linesb and c (e.g. XIII.10).
Finally, a line may “be worth” an area (e.g. X.40) or a figure (e.g. XIII.1).
On the faith of Proclos, Archimedes is normally taken to have worked after Euclid. As
observed by Schneider [1979, 61f n. 82] and Knorr [1978, 221], however, his works build on
pre-Euclidean mathematics and not on the EuclideanElements; as a witness of early terminology,
he can thus be considered on a par with Euclid.
Archimedes’ use of thedýnamis/dýnasthai terminology varies from work to work – a fact
which was used by Knorr as supplementary evidence in his investigation of the relative
chronology of the Archimedean corpus [1978, 264 n. 124a]. Most of the occurrences fall under
the types also attested in Euclid: Ratiodynámei in contrast to ratiosimpliciter or mékei; and
a line “being worth” a rectangle or a plane figure. At times, however, a line “is worth the same”
as a rectangle (e.g.De sphaera et cylindro I.29, 1241). Furthermore, there seems to be a tendency
(according to Knorr’s relative chronology) for earlier works to use occasionally the idiom in
free speech and for late works to restrict it to formulaic expressions and quotations of established
theorems.
Like Euclid’s work, the Archimedean corpus thus suggests that thedýnamis/dýnasthai-usage
was being left behind in the free language of third-century geometers while being preserved
(and still used) in a frozen state in formulaic expressions. This is further confirmed in
Apollonios’ Conica, with one qualification: Apollonios takes advantage of the possibilities of
the terms to compress complicated expressions, creating formulae of his own (e.g. III.54, 44015,
where a ratio is composed from one ratiodynámei and another ordinary ratio between areas).
5 Aujac [1984; 1984a] has investigated such word-by-word preservation of the phrasing of
theorems, involving also Euclid and pre-Euclidean spherics.
Later geometers would still use the formulae but only by tradition. This is demonstrated
by Pappos, in whoseMathematical Collection (along with some 20 correct quotations of the
old formulations) thedýnamis and tetragon formulations of theData are mixed up as “the
dynámeis of the sides of the triangles” (63811-13). Direct and indirect testimony is supplied by
an anonymous 2nd century A.D. commentary toTheaetetus [Burnyeat 1978, 497]: It tells that
“the ancients called tetragonsdynámeis”; evidently, the readers are supposed not to know –
and the commentator on his part seems not to know that the two terms though somehow
semantically connected were used differently.
It is then no wonder that even Hero speaks of ratiosdynámei v. mékei in Metrica I.19,
5418 – nor that a passage of I.34 (8228f) appears to make a rectangle and not a line the subject
of the verbdýnasthai (appears, since the passage is anyhow illegitimately elliptic and therefore
possibly corrupt6). At other places, however, striking deviations from familiar expressions turn
up. A passage in I.15 (4222-25) runs “and take away fromdynámei 121dynámei 36, remainder
dynámei 25, which is mékei 5”. Dynámei 121 is thus simply√121=11, which in a more
traditional formulation might appear as “that whichdynámei is 121”, corresponding also to
the expression “ΒΘ dynámei 180” found three lines above (freely to be interpretedΒΘ2=180
or ΒΘ=√180). But the phrase in lines 22-24 contains none of those articles and relative pronouns
which in normal Greek mathematical texts indicate elided words.Dynámei N is simply used
for √N.
If we go to I.17, 485f, on the other hand, “the <ratio> of thedýnamis of the <tetragon>
on ΒΓ to the <tetragon> onΒΓ upon the <tetragon> onΑ∆” designates the ratio ofΒΓ4 to
ΒΓ2 Α∆2. Dýnamis N is thusN2. So, the Platonic ambiguity between “square” and “square root”
turns up again in this rather late and very un-Platonic text (though grammatically distinguished
as it should be in an efficient technical terminology).
THE “CALCULATOR’S DYNAMIS”
The ΒΓ4 of Metrica I.17 is also spoken of as “thedynamodýnamis upon ΒΓ” (4821),
Diophantos’ term for the fourth power. It might therefore seem that the numerically oriented
mathematicians of later antiquity merely embraced a traditional geometrical concept and shaped
it for their own purpose. I shall call this concept (that of Hippocrates, Euclid, Archimedes,
6 Hero cites Archimedes,De conoidibus et sphaeroidibus, for the statement that “theN/A
<rectangle> under the axes [of an ellipse] is worth the circleA equalA to the ellipse”
[N=nominative case ending,A=accusative], but afterwards uses the correct theorem that the
product of the axes equals thesquare of the diameter of the circle in question. In a footnote,
Heiberg proposes the correction “... is worth <the diameterA> of the circleG equalG ...”
[G=genitive], which would still be irregular; the emendation “... is worth <the diameterN> of
the circleG equalG ...”, however, would put everything straight, apart from a legitimate though
rather unusual inversion.
Apollonios and Pappos) the “geometers’dýnamis”, in agreement with the passages from
Metaphysica andPoliticus quoted above. More likely, however, the similarities between Plato’s
and Hero’s texts should be explained with reference to an old, related but distinct “calculators’
dýnamis”. To this point I shall return; for the moment I shall only argue for the existence of
the entity in question.
It turns up rather explicitly in Plato’sRepublica 587d, during the discussion of the distance
between the tyrant’s phantasmagoric pleasure and real pleasure, which, when regarded as
“number of the length” (του µηκους αριθµος ), is argued by Socrates to be the “plane number”
3 3=9. It is then “clear, in truth, how great a distance it is removed according todýnamis and
third increase” (κατα δυναµιν και τριτην αυ xην) – a statement upon which Glaucon
comments: “clear at least to the calculator” (δηlος τω γεlογιστικω). In this gently ironic portrait
of his brother7 Plato evidently supposes that the mathematically illiterate will have known the
word dýnamis as belonging to the field of practical calculation (logistics) rather than to that
of theoretical geometry. Furthermore, logistics is supposed by Socrates’ remark to deal with
three different numerical manifestations of one and the same entity, as “number of the length”,
dýnamis, and “third increase”. Kindly enough, Plato tells us that these are not just the “linear”,
“square”, and “cube numbers” known from Greek theoretical arithmetic (and fromTheaetetus),
the “number of the length” being already a square number; they have to correspond to the first,
second and third power of the entity.
Presumably, the “calculators’dýnamis” is also mentioned inTimaeus 31c-32a8. At most,
however, this passage provides us with the extra information that the terminology for the “third
power” was vacillating. More interesting as an elucidation of theRepublica passage and of
the “calculators’ dýnamis” are the terms used in Diophantos’Arithmetica. As he explains in
his foreword, Diophantos speaks of square and cube numbers as “tetragons” (τετραγωνοι) and
“cubes” (κυbοι), respectively (218-22). In agreement with general convention, however, the second
and third power of the unknown number (theαριθµος) are spoken of asdýnamis (δυνaµις,
abbreviated∆Y) and cube (κυbος/ΚY) (415-17)9. Now, it is known that part of Diophantos’
7 The reading of the passage as benign irony is supported by the similar portrait of thejeunessse-
doré-attitudes of the other brother Adeimantos in 420a.
8 Souilhé [1919, 124] reads the passage differently, equatingδυναµις with “force” andοκος
with “masse”. This is not very plausible in view of the context.
This passage exhausts the number of mathematical occurrences of thedýnamis in the Platonic
corpus, together with another passage inT maeus (54b), where in the triangle obtained by
bisection of the equilateral triangle one side is said to be the triple of the other “according to
dýnamis” (κατα δυναµιν ). (I disregard a possible hint in the notoriously obscureRepublica
546b, and the occurrences in the pseudo-PlatonicEp nomis).
9 As pointed out by Rashed [1984, 113], the termdýnamis is introduced at an earlier stage than
unknown numbers. Only by saying that “it has been approved” (εδοκιµασθη ) that in this form
the square of numbers becomes one of the “elements of arithmetical theory” (στοιχειοσ της
αριθµετικης θεωριασ ), does Diophantos make clear that he is already here aiming at the only
actual use of the term later on,viz., as a designation for the square of the unknownαριθµος.
algebraic formalism is taken from earlier Greek calculators: The abbreviation for theαριθµος
is used in a c. 1st century (A.D.) papyrus (see [Robbins 1929] and [Vogel 1930]), and the term
δυναµοδυναµις for the fourth power was used during the same century by Hero (cf. above).
Furthermore, part of Diophantos’ material (I.xvi-xix, xxii-xxv) is borrowed from traditions of
recreational mathematics (“purchase of a horse”, “finding a purse”, etc.; see [Tropfke/Vogel
1980, 606-613]) which already in Plato’s time had given rise to theoretical treatment
(“Thymarides flower”; see [Heath 1921, 94ff]). Since the distinction made betweensquare
number and dýnamis coincides with that made inRepublica 587d, it appears reasonable to
assume that even this is due to continuity, and that the Diophantos’ “general convention”
followed the old calculators known to Glaucon in its specific use ofdýnamis10.
If this is so, “geometers’” and “calculators’dýnamis” are of course related but yet different
concepts, and one must be assumed to derive from the other. For the moment, we will have
to leave open the question of the direction of influence, and return our attention to the geometers’
concept, which is better documented in the sources.
INTERPRETING (I)
The difficulty of explainingdýnamis plainly as another name either fortetragon or for
side is as evident as the difficulty of explaining away the evidence in favor of the rival
explanation. Instead, two new interpretations (both involving centrally the verbdýnasthai) have
been proposed by Szabó and Taisbak.
Taisbak [1980; summarized in 1982, 72-76] proposed a reading ofdýnasthai as “to master”,
in the sense that a line “masters” that two-dimensional extension which it is able to cover by
a square; thisextension should be understood as an entity different from both the square as
a geometrical figure and from its area regarded as anumber resulting from mensuration. In
its origin, dýnamis should then be a term for the extension. For later times, Taisbak proposed
a reduction to an ill-understood rudiment. The use of the term for a line should result from
informal speaking among mathematicians.
Szabó’s explanation [1969, 46f; reworked 1986] built on the well-documented use of
At the same time, he notes that he is following a general convention from a discipline of
“arithmetical theory” which is neither Euclidean nor Neopythagorean (Nicomachos uses the
term quite differently, as we shall see). Only Diophantos’ own brand of arithmetic seems to
be left, i.e.,algebra.
10 Few instances of ancient second-degree “algebra” below the level of Diophantos have survived
in sources from classical antiquity. Some, however, can be found scattered throughout surveyors’
and related texts. E.g., in theGeometrica ascribed to Hero, xxi.9-10 (38015-31), the dimensions
of a circle are found from the sum of diameter, perimeter, and area, while the Roman agrimensor
Nipsus (2nd c. A.D?) treats the problem of a right-angled triangle with known hypotenuse and
area in hisPodismus (297f). We can hence be sure that basic second-degree “algebra” was indeed
known to the ancient practitioners.
dýnasthai as “being worth” in a real commercial sense (“theshekel is worth 7 obols”). This
is supposed to have inspired a use expressing the notion thata square is equal tosome other
surface (a rectangle or a sum of squares); for some reason (“irgendwie” [1986, 359]), the
expression involves the side of the square as the subject, and not the square itself. Formally,
a dýnamis should be a line; in reality, however, it should denote the square constructed upon
the line, but only on condition that this square is equal to another surface.
In order to underpin his interpretation, Szabó claimed that theκατα δυναµιν usage of
the passages fromRepublica and Timaeus (in fact the earliest certain appearances of the
mathematicaldýnamis) is derivative, while the dativedynámei used from the late Platonic
dialogues onward reflects the original thinking. Even if this hypothesis is granted, the rather
loose language of the remaining pre-Euclidean sources is problematic for a strict reading of
Szabó’s thesis – a line being sometimes worth other lines, sometimes “the same” as other lines,
etc. If the thesis is read more loosely than originally intended, however, as informal speaking,
neither the early Platonic occurrences nor the lax formulations are serious challenges; interpreted
like this, on the other hand, the explanation comes close to Taisbak’s.
Before considering either of these positions, I shall step outside the circle of Greek language
and culture.
A BABYLONIAN PARALLEL
To a historian of Babylonian mathematics, the apparent ambiguity between “square” and
“square root” has a familiar ring. Both the basic Old Babylonian term for a geometric square
(mithartum) and the Sumerogram normally translated as “square root”( í b - s i8) appear (when
translated into modern terminology and concepts) to designate alternatingly the square and its
side. The semantic basis ofí b - s i8 is equality (viz., equality of the sides of a square), whereas
that ofmithartum is the confrontation of equivalents (still as sides of a square). Interestingly,
the Babylonian term for “countervalue” or “commercial rate” (mahirum) derives from the same
root asmithartum, viz., from mahārum, “to stand up against, to encounter, to receive [an
antagonist, an equivalent, a peer]”. So, the linking of “square”, “side of square”, “commercial
rate”, “equivalence”, and “confrontation of force”, so puzzling in Greek mathematics, is shared
with the mathematics of the old eastern neighbor. Could it be that the Greek term translates
a borrowed technical concept, using a Greek term possessing the same connotational range as
the original Semitic term11? And could a possible borrowing, or simply the conceptual parallel,
11 Next to nothing is known about the transmission of Babylonian mathematics after the end
of the Old Babylonian period (c. 1600 B.C.), but that transmission took place is sure. As I have
shown in my [1986, 457-468], a 12th-century Latin translation from the Arabic follows Old
Babylonian ways down to the choice of grammatical forms. That the Greek calculators owed
part of their technique to the Near East is also apparent from the name of their favorite
instrument, theαβαξ , the [dust] abacus, which is borrowed from western Semiticbq, “light
dust” (the root is absent in Babylonian). Since finally the termmahirum is testified in Hebrew
help us understand the nuances of the Greek term?
Since our earliest sources (be it Plato or the Eudemos/Hippocrates fragment) use the
dýnamis-terminology in developed form, the original idea behind it cannot be established beyond
doubt, and conceptual and terminological diffusion (from Babylonia or, indeed, from anywhere)
can be neither proved nor ruled out as a possibility. The answer to the first question is an
uninteresting “yes – anythingcould be”. For the time being, the hypothesis can only be tested
for plausibility and fruitfulness, the former depending largely on the latter, i.e., on the answer
to our second question. We shall therefore need a closer look at the Babylonian concepts.
According to its derivation and to cognate terms,mithartum designates an entity arising
from the confrontation of equivalents (the confrontation of the line and itsmehrum or
“counterpart” – another derivative from the same root). A number of texts show that the
mithartum, when a number is ascribed to it,is the length of the side andpossesses an area12.
No single text can be found where the square is identified with its area, aswe would tend to
do, and as is inherent in the Euclidean tetragon as a “figure” (σχηµα ), i.e., as something which
is “encompassed by some boundary or boundaries” (υπο τινος η τινως ορως περιεχοµενον)
(Elements I, def. 22 and 14). On the other hand, other evidence shows beyond a doubt that
the mithartum is a geometrical square and not a mere line adjacent to a square – e.g., BM
15285 [MKT I, 137f], where the squares aredrawn.
This may seem strange to us. From a culturally neutral standpoint, however, our own ways
are equally strange. Why should a complex geometrical configuration – four equal lines at right
angles delimiting a plane surface – be considered identical with the measure of the plane surface,
rather than with the measure of one of the lines? Once the configuration is given, one
parametrization is as good as the other. So, the ambiguity of themit artum concept vanishes:
It is not alternatingly square and square root, but simply the figure identified by – and hence
with – its side.
The case ofí b - s i8 is similar. Etymologically and in most occurrences the term is a verb.
A phrase like“ 8 1 - e 9 í b - s i8” must apparently be read as “81 makes 9 equal-[sided]”
13.
In some occurrences, the term is used as a noun, related tomithartum, i.e., as a square figure
parametrized by the length of its side – at times when the side of a square of known area is
asked for, but occasionally as a description of the geometrical configuration itself. In some
in the related formmehı̄r, a Western Semitic (Phoenician?) contact is no less linguistically
possible than direct Babylonian influence.
Without taking Proclos’Commentary more seriously than it deserves, we may also remember
his ascription in 655 of “accurate investigation of numbers” (τως αριθµων ακριβης γνωσις)
to the Phoenicians, which he derives from the needs of logistics.
12 E.g., BM 13901,passim [MKT III, 1-5]. The first problem can be translated: “I have added
the area and mymithartum, it is 3/4”. The solution states that themithartum, the square identified
with its side, is1/2.
13 This follows both from the Sumerian ergative suffix -e and from interrogative variants of
the phrase showing 9 to be an accusative. Exemplifications can be traced through the glossaries
of MKT.
instances, finally, the term occurs as a verb denoting the creation from a length of the
corresponding quadratic figure (butnot its area)14♦ . Once again, the square is considered under
the aspect of a figure made up of equal sides, not as a plane surface surrounded by such sides.
INTERPRETING (II)
With this in mind we shall return to the Greek material – first to the concepts
“commensurable in respect of length” (µηκει συµµετροι ) and “commensurable in respect of
dýnamis” (δυναµει συµµετροι ) from Elements X, def. 2-3. Two straight lines (ευθειαι
[γραµµαι ]) are commensurable “in respect of length” if they have a common measure when
each is regarded without sophistication as a length – aµηκος. They are commensurable “in
respect ofdýnamis” when the tetragons on them have a common measure – that is, whenthe
two lines themselves arecommensurable if regarded in the Babylonian way, as representing
squares. The common grammatical form (the dative) ofµηκει andδυναµει suggests that the
two terms should stand in the same relation to the straight lines; since the linecan indubitably
be apprehended as a length, it should also be possible to apprehend it as aýn mis (and itshould
be seen so in “commensurability in respect ofdýnamis”). But the parallel leads still further.
Since in the former case the lengths themselves have the common measure, in the latter case
the dynámeis must be the things measured (remember that the Greek measuring procedure is
a process of covering or taking away, cf. theanthyphairesis). Thedýnamis can hence hardly
be anything but amithartum, a square identified with its side (but still of course possessing
an area to which a measuring number can be ascribed). Otherwise expressed, thedýnamis is
a line seen under the aspect of square.
If instead of commensurability we had looked at ratiodynámei andmékei, as known from
Archimedes, the same arguments could have been developed. In both cases it becomes evident
why we never find expressions like “commensurability in respect of tetragon” or “ratio in respect
of tetragon”: Tetragons themselves are commensurable (if they are) and in possession of a mutual
ratio – they are not aspects of a line. The absence of such expressions will also follow from
Taisbak’s interpretation of the term; it is, however, somewhat enigmatic if “dýnamis” is believed
to be nothing but another word for “tetragon”, Why, in fact, shouldE ements XII.2 when
reformulating the Hippocratean theorem that circles have the same ratio “as their diameters
dynámei” also change the grammatical construction if it had been meaningful to speak of ratios
τετραγωνω? Truly, grammatical habits might have changed over the centuries, but this would
then affect both terms had they really been synonyms (as, in fact, we see in Pappos’ late mix-up).
If we turn to Theaetetus, the first use ofdýnamis as a “square of three [square] feet” is
of course in harmony with the interpretation of the term as amithartum – τριπους, “of three
14 A full documentation of the varying uses ofí b - s i8 would lead too far astray. It belongs
with a larger investigation of Babylonian “algebra” (work in progress; preliminary report in
[H¢yrup 1984], final to appear in [H¢yrup 1990]).
feet”, is an adjective and hence not necessarily to be regarded as an identity. The later passage,
in which the young Theaetetos introduces his definition distinguishing two sorts of lines
(γραµµαι), is more interesting: on one hand, a line which can be “spoken of” as a length, i.e.,
a line the length of which can be measured by a rational number which can be used as its name,
is called a “length”, aµηκος. On the other hand a line which can only be “spoken of”, i.e.,
be given a numerical name, when regarded under its aspect ofdýnamis; such a line is called
a dýnamis (it will be remembered that the Greek term which translates as “rational” isρητος,
meaning “which can be spoken”).
According to themithartum interpretation, the definitions introduced by Theaetetos are
no longer shocking, clumsy, or childish, as they have been regarded by various authors.
Theaetetos does not call a square root a square, or anything like that. Truly, any line can in
advance be regarded as adýnamis, and Theaetetos restricts the use of the term to such lines
which in a certain sense areonly to be spoken of asdynámeis. This is, however, a precise
analogue of another well-known Greek dichotomy: Some numbers are “square numbers”: They
can be “engendered as equal times equal” (ισον ισακις γιγνεσθαι ), i.e., produced as the product
of two equal factors. In principle, a “square number” is also “oblong” – it can be produced
as the product of unequal factors: 4 4=8 2; 3 3=9 1. The name “oblong number” (αριθµος
προµηκης) is, however, reserved for such numbers which areonly oblong, i.e., to non-square
numbers. This delimitation is introduced by Theaetetos in the same dialogue just before the
“shocking” definitions of “length” and “dýnamis” (147e9-148a4), and nobody has ever been
shocked. Yet, according to themithartum interpretation, the logic of the two definitions is strictly
the same. No puzzles are left. The passages fromTheaetetus, as well as the entire material on
the “geometers’dýnamis”, fit the interpretation of thedýnamis as a concept of the same structure
as the Babylonian conceptualization of the square.
As already stated, the linking betweendýnamis, commercial worth, and confrontation of
force is a feature shared with the Babylonianmithartum. No Babylonian mathematical term
equivalent todýnasthai exists, however. Nor does there appear to be in Babylonian mathematics
any concept or procedure which necessitates such a word. So, even if thedýnamis may be
imported or inspired from Babylonia, the termdýnasthai appears to be a genuine Greek
development due to the integration of thedýnamis concept into the theoretical structure of Greek
geometry. We see inTheaetetus 148b2 a possible way for such a development, when Plato
speaks of “the plane figures” which the linesdýnantai, i.e., “have in their power to form when
seendynámei” or “are worth” under the same aspect. This could also be the metaphorical sense
of which Aristotle speaks inMetaphysica 1019b33f, and it suggests that the Greeks may have
conceptualized the term in Taisbak’s manner in the mid-fourth century (and maybe earlier),
independently of its origin. This, in connection with the verb’s connotations of equivalence
and being worth, could then easily lead to the general loose usage in which lines or surfaces
(Hero!) can be said todýnasthai other lines or surfaces, but where in all cases the equality
involved is one of surfaces, not of lengths.
On the other hand, thedýnamis might also stand for amithartum-like concept without
having been borrowed at the conceptual level. Both concepts could have developed independently
on the basis of analogous or shared measuringpractices15. In this case, the shared secondary
connotations of the two terms must be considered accidental (which, given the connotative
richness of both languages, could easily have happened).
“CALCULATORS’ DYNAMIS” REVISITED
So, if we restrict our reflections to the “geometers’dýnamis”, conceptual borrowing and
independent development of analogous conceptualizations of the square figure are equally good
causal explanations of the apparentmi hartum-structure of the Greek concept. This, however,
brings us to the question of the “calculators’dýnamis”. If, as was argued, Greek calculators
may plausibly have been in possession of second-degree algebra showing terminological
continuity up to Diophantos, it can hardly have been an indigenous development; it would have
been inspired (or, more probably, imported) from some Middle Eastern algebra descending
from the Old Babylonian tradition. Now, I have shown elsewhere that Old Babylonian “algebra”
cannot have been arithmetical, i.e., conceptualized as dealing with unknown numbers organized
by means of numerical operations16. Instead it appears to have been organized on the basis
of “naive”, non-deductive geometry, of a sort related to that used by al-Khwa¯rizmı̄ in hisAlgebra
to justify the standard algorithms used to solve the basic mixed second-degree equations (see
[Rosen 1831, 13-21], or one of the published Medieval Latin translations, e.g., [Hughes 1986,
236-241]), but of course without his Greek-type letter symbolism. Since the Arabic treatise
mentioned in note 11 was of a similar sort, a descendant which inspired Greek calculators can
hardly have been much different. Even early Greek “calculator-algebra” will consequently have
dealt with “real” lines and squares, not with sums and products of pure numbers17. Truly, the
“real” lines and squares may have been rows and patterns of pebbles on an abacus-board, rather
than the continuous lines of a drawing – cf. below.
At the same time, the branch of Old Babylonian mathematics in whichm thartum and í b -
s i 8 occur most frequently is the so-called “algebra”. So, if a conceptual import into Greece
15 I am grateful to Professor Tilman Krischer of the Freie Universität Berlin for pointing out
the importance of this possibility in his comments on an earlier version of the present paper.
16 Once more, documentation would lead too far astray – cf. note 14 above. The simplest part
of the evidence comes from an analysis of the terminological structure of the texts. Two different
“additive” operations are kept strictly apart in a way which has no meaning in an arithmetical
interpretation, i.e., if the terms were synonyms for the one and only numerical addition.
Similarly, two different “subtractions” and four different “multiplications” are distinguished.
17 If we take Plato’s testimony at its words, it suggests the same. The third power was spoken
of as the “third increase”, which fits well with a spatial conceptualization but rather poorly
with an arithmetical representation before the introduction of exponential symbolism or spatial
representation. Arithmetically, we would have the number itself, the increase (i.e., the second
power), and the second increase, i.e., our third power.
has indeed taken place, the plausible channel is “calculator-algebra” rather than theoretical
geometry. This would make the “calculators’dýnamis” the primary concept from which the
“geometers’dýnamis” would be derived.
Hero’s curious phraseology (“dynámei 25, which ismékei 5” – cf. above) might then belong
rather with his calculator than with his Archimedean affiliation. It belongs indeed with a
numerical calculation. As inRepublica 587d, the same concrete entity is represented by several
numbers; and as in the second passage fromTheaetetus, the mathematics of the passage suggests
the translation “root”. If the segregation of a geometricaldýnamis was only taking place during
Plato’s (and Theaetetos’) youth, these specific parallels between Plato and Hero are probably
manifestations of the closeness of both to calculators’ usage.
If, on the other hand, thedýnamis-concept was indigenously developed, we would rather
expect its origin to belong with geometry and mensuration. This would make the “calculators’
dýnamis” a metaphor, and suggest that, in spite of its dependence on pre-scientific sources and
methods, logistics had already come under the sway of scientific mathematics in respect of
metaphorics and conceptualizations around 400 B.C. If one on the balance between references
to logistics and to the purer branches of mathematics in the earlier part of the Platonic corpus
(including Republica andTimaeus), this seems highly improbable.
THE DYNAMIS OF FIGURATE NUMBERS
Furthermore, an origin of our term in logistics will also fit its use in the “Pythagorean”
theory of figurate numbers better than an origin in theoretical geometry. Here, indeed, the word
turns up in a way which could well be related to its use in a “pebble-algebra” but not to its
geometrical function.
By “pebble-algebra” I refer to a possible representation of a second-degree “algebra” in
Babylonian style by means of pebbles on the abacus board. Indeed, who says “calculator” in
a Greek context says “pebble” orψηφος – the main tool of the calculator being the abacus
with appurtenant pebble calculi. It is also a well-established fact that the “doctrine of odd and
even”, as well as the whole theory of figurate numbers, grew out of the patterns in which pebbles
could be arranged (cf. [Lefèvre 1981]). It is therefore near at hand to assume thatif some
calculator algebra was in use in classical Greece it was performed (exclusively or occasionally)
with pebbles on the abacus board18.
This observation is interesting for several reasons.Firstly, the interest in figurate numbers
(including the “square” and “oblong” numbers spoken of by Theaetetos) ceases to be the result
of some play with abacus pebbles irrelevant to their normal use. Square, gnomonic and oblong
18 Since the abacus appears first to have been borrowed in the form of a dust abacus from the
Near East (cf. above, note 11), and since this device was used for geometric drawings throughout
antiquity, occasional use of real drawings on a dustboard is also a possibility and in fact appears
to fit Nipsus’ problem (see note 10) better than pebble manipulation.
numbers occur naturally as soon as one tries to represent a mixed second-degree problem on
the board. So, e.g., the problem x+y=8, x y=15 is represented and solved thus:
A B C D
=> => =>
o
The virtual starting point for the analytical procedure is a pattern of 15 pebbles (A), whose length
and width taken separately are unknown, whereas the sum of the length and the width is known
to be8. In the real process of solution we therefore start by laying out a gnomon with8/2=4
pebbles in each leg, and fill out the inside until all 15 pebbles have been used (B). This shows
that [a square of1 1=] 1 pebble is lacking in order to complete the square (C), and that hence
1 row has to be moved from bottom to the right in order to actualize the virtual rectangle (D)19.
Apart from the occurrence of oblong, gnomonic and square numbers (all basic entities in
the theory of figurate numbers) we see that one of the basic theorems of the theory follows
immediately from the procedure –viz., that the sum of the firstn odd numbers equalsn2. Even
the triangular numbers and the theorem that the sum of two consecutive triangular numbers
is a square number are seen on the figure, although these observations play no role in the
process. As soon as one starts reflecting theoretically on the patterns, triangular numbers and
their properties, as well as those of the gnomonic, square and oblong numbers, turn up as obvious
questions20; the theory of figurate numbers emerges as atheory dealing with the general
properties of existent tools and practices instead of being an idle play picked up from nowhere.
Secondly, an astonishing use of the termdýnamis in Pythagorean or Neopythagorean
arithmetic becomes meaningful. In configurationC, themithartum-dýnamis is evidently4. This
is the line which “squares off” the complete pattern, in Theaetetos’ words. Now, the term turns
up in Nicomachos’Introduction to Arithmetic in a way which could easily be explained as a
generalization of this usage but which is otherwise anomalous. If we look at configurationA,
we see the number15 being arranged in thirds – according to Nicomachos in parts which “by
name” (ονοµατι ) are 3 and dynámei (or κατα δυναµιν – both forms are used) are5 (see,
e.g., I.viii.7, 161]). This is no far-fetched transfer of the meaning inC, even though contact
19 If the problem had beenx-y=2, x y=15, we would start stepB with the inner gnomon, the
one with legs containing 2 pebbles, and add new layers at the outside. Apart from that, the
same configurations would have to be used. Odd values ofx±y, on the other hand, require further
refinement.
20 In his investigation of the prehistory of incommensurability, Knorr [1975, 142ff] comes to
similar pebble-configurations and conclusions from another angle and deals with the matter
in much more detail.
with the geometrical meaning is lost.
Other 1st or 2nd century (A.D.) doxographic sources suggest that the usage is not a
Nicomachean idiosyncrasy. They concern one of the central Pythagorean concepts, thetetractys
or decade drawn up as a triangular number:
According to Aëtius (Placita I.3.8), the Pythagoreans “declare ... that thedýnamis of ten is in
four, and in the tetrad” (των δεκα ...φησιν, ε δυναµις εστιν εν τοις τεσσαρσι και τηι
τετραδι ) (Fragment 58 B 15 [Diels/Kranz 1951 I, 5441]). Taken in itself this phrase is
ambiguous, and could well mean that the power of the magical number 10 resides in its possible
triangular arrangement astetractys. Hierocles, however, is more explicit in a commentary to
supposedly early Pythagorean writings, stating that “thedýnamis of the decade is the tetrad”
(της δε δεκαδος δυναµις ε τετρας) ([Mullach 1875 I, 464B], quoted from [Souilhé 1919,
23]). So, these two doxographers (who will hardly be suspected of innovative mathematical
terminology) appear to refer to a generalization of the concept ofdýnamis different from but
very close to that of Nicomachos: Once more, the “base” of a non-square figurate number is
taken as its characteristic parameter and given the name belonging to the same parameter in
the case of a square figurate number.
FURTHER OBSERVATIONS
Can we get any nearer to the process, or has the meager material now been exhausted?
We can in fact squeeze the sources harder, observing that the two “intermediate” Platonic
dialogues contain the expressionκατα δυναµιν , whereas the late dialogues (Theaetetus,
Politicus) as well as all other authors (except the non-geometrical Nicomachos) invariably use
the simple dativedynámei. This suggests that the technical use of the term was only crystallizing
in Plato’s later years, around the mid-fourth century; by then, on the other hand, a fully technical
“geometers’dýnamis” was crystallizing.
Firstly, this observation makes it seem highly doubtful that Hippocrates’ own words are
rendered exactly in the Eudemos fragment, which agrees so perfectly with the style of late
Platonic, Aristotelian, and Archimedean occurrences21. The fragment seems rather to contain
Eudemos’ reformulations in his own phrase structures of Hippocrates’ ideas, concepts and basic
terms (including probably some forms ofdýnamis anddýnasthai). This conclusion is independent
of all other hypotheses on the meaning and origin of our terms.
21 The same doubt as to the literal precision of Eudemos’ quotation was recently formulated
by Knorr [1986, 38f] on the basis of other evidence.
Secondly, cautious assumptions on the temporal distance between the introduction of a
mathematical terminology and its crystallization in fixed linguistic forms (viz., the assumption
that in an interactive environment this distance should be of the order of one or two generations
of masters and students) support our earlier conclusion that the segregation of a distinct
“geometers’dýnamis” from a naive-geometric or pebble-based calculators’ concept occurred
during Plato’s youth or shortly before. A central role could then perhaps be ascribed to
Hippocrates and Theodoros.
An observation made by Neuenschwander [1973, 329ff] may indicate in which connection
the innovation took place. Time and again, the early books of theElements use a principle which
is neither proved nor stated as an axiom,viz.,
AB = CD <=> (AB)2 = (CD)2
Now, it follows from Neuenschwander’s analysis that when this principle is applied in Books
II and IV, it is most often stated explicitly. When it is used in Books I and III, however, it
remains implicit, except in III.35-36; precisely these two propositions deal with areas of
parallelograms, and their subject-matter is thus related to that of Book II. We may conclude
that only the tradition behind Books II and IV, the “metrical tradition” dealing centrally with
areas of plane figures and continuing itself in the theory of irrationals, based intself on a set
of concepts making it natural to notice and formulate the application of the principle, which
is nothing but the interchangeability of equalitymékei anddynámei. This agrees perfectly with
the hypothesis of a Near Eastern borrowing, because the branch of geometry which could be
inspired by Babylonian “naive-geometric” algebra (or a Greek “calculators’ algebra”, for that
matter) is precisely the so-called “geometric algebra” ofElements II (I shall not mix up the
discussion of this much-debated term with the present investigation). It also fits well with the
branches of geometry which later make use of thedýnamis idiom: Elements X and XIII, etc.
A final observation concerns the very idea of a “conceptual import”. Truly, the translation
of dýnamis into mithartum makes good sense of all occurrences of the term prior to Pappos.
Still, the “geometers’dýnamis” belongs within a conceptual context differing fundamentally
from that of themithartum; from the principle that the concepts of a connected body of thought
are themselves connected we should therefore expect that the idea of a translation can only
be approximately true.
This is in fact borne out by closer analysis of some of our Greek texts. In the definition
of “commensurabilitydynámei” in Elements X, the entities which are explicitly measured by
an area (χωρος) are the tetragons on the lines. Implicitly, however, the expression supposes
that thelines regarded in their aspect ofdynámeis are measured (since the lines themselves
are com-mensurable in that aspect). Earlier, in the Eudemos fragment, bases and diameters
themselves are said explicitly to have a ratio (viz., the ratio of the areas of their squares) under
the same condition. This must mean that the area belonging with a line regarded as
parametrization of a square figure is less of an external accessory than the area of a Babylonian
mithartum – the Greeks, apprehending the tetragon-square as well as circles and other plane
figures as identicalwith their areas, tended to assimilate thedýnamis-square into the same
pattern22. In the case of the “calculators’dýnamis” this becomes even more evident, since
the Diophantinedýnamis has assumed the numerical role in his problems which the area (- š à
or eqlum) and not themithartum assumes in Babylonian texts.
Precisely this conceptual incongruity is probably the reason for the disappearance of the
termsdýnamis anddýnasthai from the active vocabulary of geometers by the early third century,
except in specific technical niches (commensurabilitydynámei) and formulaic expressions. The
terms did not fit the mental organization of Greek mathematics once its various branches and
disciplines had gone into the melting-pot of Alexandrian learning.
As to the termdýnamis itself, it is clear that the connotational similarity to themithartum
does not reflect a Babylonian understanding of the square as a result of a confrontation of equals
or counterparts. If not accidental, the shared connotations (involving physical force and
commercial value) will have to be explained at the level of the “folk etymology” (the “folk”
in question being calculators or possibly geometers): as an attempt to understand why the Semitic
masters called a “line regarded under the aspect of the appurtenant square” by a strange name
related to the confrontation of values and force, an attempt then reflected in the Greek term
chosen to denote the same object.
Such a pseudo-etymology may from the beginning have been connected to explanations
proposed on the basis of the Greek language: The square which a line “has the power to form”,
“is worth” or “masters”. Such metaphors may also have been introduced as secondary explanation
when memory of a foreign origin had been forgotten (which could have happened quickly).
A “Babylonian” and a “Greek” interpretation of the term need not be mutually exclusive; in
some way they probably supplement each other.
CONCLUSIONS
As stated by Berggren [1984, 402], there are in the early history of Greek mathematics
“sufficient documents to support a variety of reconstructions but an insufficient number to narrow
the list of contending theories to one”. This pessimism is confirmed by the impossibility of
reaching consensus on the merits of such great reconstructions as [Szabó 1969] and [Knorr
1975]23. For the time being, no compelling reconstruction can apparently be written; instead,
further progress may be made through construction of scenarios for all or parts of the
development, which may open our eyes to hitherto unnoticed features in the source material
at hand. Such scenarios should be internally coherent and in agreement with available documents,
22 Conversely, in its exact form the Greek concept could of course have no place with the
Babylonians. A Babylonian line (and any other geometrical entity) is identified by, and
conceptually not distinguished from its measuring number. A Greek line, however, is
conceptually distinct both from the number of unit lengths contained in it when regarded as
a length and from the number of unit squares covering it when regardeddynámei.
23 Cf. also the review of a number of ongoing controversies in [Berggren 1984].
and should be compared with rival interpretations of history on their merits in these respects;
however, they need not claim in advance to be necessary truths.
The above discussion, which includes an abundance of hypothetical formulatiosn, is meant
primarily to provide suggestions for such a partial scenario. Still, the knitting is not so tight
that all parts of the argument stand and fall together; nor are they equally hypothetical.
Among the positively supported results is the distinction between a “geometers’dýnamis”
and a “calculators’dýnamis”. Both groups made use of the term, but they did so for different
purposes and inside different conceptual frameworks, and hence necessarily in partially different
ways –vide the quotations from Hero. Direct evidence was also given for the assignment of
the crystallization of the geometricaldýnamis usage to Plato’s late years – and hence also for
the doubt concerning the Hippocratean origin of the exact formulations in the Eudemos fragment.
The interpretation of the geometricaldýnamis-concept as “a square identified by, and hence
with, its side” is also supported by the sources regarded as a totality in the sense that the
apparent ambiguities in the usage can only be surmounted by an interpretation of this kind.
The possibility that such a concept was held is established through themi artum-parallel.
More hypothetical are the primacy of the “calculators’dýnamis” over the “geometers
dýnamis”; the interpretation of the early “calculators’dýnamis” as belonging with a naive-
geometric or pebble-based “algebra”; the suggestion that the segregation of a distinct “geometers’
dýnamis” is connected with the beginnings of the theoretical tradition behindElements II in
the later fifth century; and the hypothesis that thedýnamis is structurally similar to themithartum
because it is borrowed. Taken singly, these are nothing but possible hypotheses; together, they
appear to form a plausible scenario fitting the complete available evidence, including evidence
rarely taken into account (e.g., the finer details of Plato’s formulations in their chronology,
the hidden presence and absence of thedynámei/mékei-relation inElements I-IV, and the peculiar
Neopythagorean usage).
Independent but secondary observations are the disappearance of thedýnamis-usage and
its sole survival in formulaic language (which is no new idea); and the explanation of this
process in terms of the incongruity between the “dýnamis-square” and the normal Greek
conceptualization of squares and other plane figures as identical with the surface covered.
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